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ow the Federal Reserve reacts to economic activity has signiﬁcant
implications for the way the economy responds to various shocks. Yet
the importance of these responses has received limited attention in the
economic literature. Much of the literature devoted to the economic effects of
monetary policy concentrates on the impact of random monetary policy shocks.
By contrast, this article analyzes the effects of the systematic, or predictable,
portion of policy. Speciﬁcally, I compare how different speciﬁcations of an
interest rate rule affect a model economy’s response to a technology shock and
a monetary policy shock. In the case of a technology shock, the central bank’s
adjustment of the interest rate is totally an endogenous response to economic
events. The experiments show that, when there are signiﬁcant linkages between
real and nominal variables, the economy’s response to changes in technology
depends on the behavior of the monetary authority. With a monetary policy
shock—for example, an unexpected change in the interest rate—the effects of
that shock will depend on how the central bank subsequently reacts to changes
in inﬂation and output. In general, the way shocks propagate through the eco-
nomic system is intimately linked to the systematic behavior of the monetary
authority.
The results of the experiments have a number of signiﬁcant implications.
Most importantly, the speciﬁcation of the interest rate rule, which dictates how
the monetary authority moves the interest rate in response to inﬂation and real
activity, fundamentally affects economic behavior. The economy’s behavior
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may be very different depending on the parameters that govern how the central
bank reacts to inﬂation and the state of the economy, as well as the degree
of concern it has for interest rate smoothing. For example, the central bank’s
systematic behavior can alter the correlations between variables in the model.1
This type of policy effect calls into question whether changes in a policy in-
strument that are the result of a changing policy emphasis can be adequately
approximated as shocks to an unchanging policy rule.
The article’s emphasis on the effects of systematic monetary policy places it
in a long tradition dating back to Poole (1970), who discussed the implications
of different types of policy rules. In that paper, and in subsequent extensions to
a ﬂexible-price rational expectations environment, the primary purpose was to
compare a policy that used a monetary instrument with one that employed an
interest rate instrument.2 An outcome of that literature was that the systematic
component of monetary policy was important. Of signiﬁcance was the way that
informational frictions interacted with monetary policy, which allowed certain
types of feedback rules to improve the information content of the nominal
interest rate. This sharpening of information occurred only when the nominal
interest rate was determined endogenously, implying that the systematic por-
tion mattered only when money was the instrument of policy. Futhermore, the
systematic portion mattered solely in the way that it affected expectations of
future policy and not because it affected the current money stock.
In other types of models, such as those of Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1980),
which included nominal frictions such as sticky prices and wages, an important
element was the effect that systematic monetary policy had on the economy.
In short, anticipated money mattered. But in these papers monetary policy was
largely depicted through changes in money, rather than interest rates.
Recently, there has been renewed interest in the effects of monetary policy
when the policy instrument is more accurately depicted as the interest rate.
These investigations share some of the same features of the earlier models of
Fischer and Taylor in that some nominal variables, usually prices, are assumed
to be sticky. That is, the price level only adjusts gradually to its long-run equi-
librium value. Some notable examples of this research can be found in Batini
and Haldane (1997), McCallum and Nelson (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997), and Rudebusch and Svensson (1997). The concern of these papers is,
however, somewhat different than the one emphasized here. They concentrate
on both the welfare effects and the variability of output and inﬂation that
are induced by different forms of interest rate rules. In this article, I instead
1 Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) perform a detailed analysis of the effects that different
parameter values have on the second moments of various variables and on whether or not their
economy has a unique solution.
2 Prominent examples of this literature are Dotsey and King (1983, 1986) and Canzoneri,
Henderson, and Rogoff (1983).      
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emphasize the qualitatively different ways that a model economy behaves for
a variety of speciﬁcations of monetary policy.
Both types of investigations are important and complementary. Economic
welfare analysis is important because it is the primary concern of policy analy-
sis. But welfare measures and variances cannot in themselves inform us whether
various rules yield similar forms of behavior that are just more or less volatile,
or if behavior is changed in more fundamental ways. On these key matters,
the article is more in the spirit of the work of Christiano and Gust (1999) and
McCallum (1999), who also investigate the differences in impulse response
functions when the feedback parameters of a given policy rule are varied.
Even so, they use models that are different from the one used here.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 1 sketches the underlying model
that is common to the analysis. The key feature of the model is the presence
of price rigidity. I also indicate how an economy with sticky or sluggishly
adjusting prices behaves when the money stock is held constant, and when
a policy rule that results in real business cycle behavior of real quantities is
implicitly followed. The latter policy rule essentially negates the real effects
of price stickiness by keeping the price level and the markup constant. This
exercise provides some intuition on how the model works. Section 2 describes
the form of the interest rate rules investigated. These rules derive from the
work of John Taylor (1993). Under the ﬁrst rule, the monetary authority re-
sponds both to deviations in lagged inﬂation from target and to lagged output
from its steady-state value. The second rule adds a concern for smoothing the
behavior of the nominal interest rate. In Section 3, I analyze the response of
the model economy to a permanent increase in the level of technology. Section
4 investigates the effect of an unanticipated increase in the nominal interest
rate on the economy. Section 5 concludes.
1. THE MODEL
For the purpose of this investigation, I use a framework that embeds sticky
prices into a dynamic stochastic model of the economy. Under ﬂexible prices
and zero inﬂation, the underlying economy behaves as a classic real business
cycle model. The model is, therefore, of the new neoclassical synthesis variety
and displays features that are common to much of the current literature using
sticky-price models.3 Agents have preferences over consumption and leisure,
and rent productive factors to ﬁrms. For convenience, money is introduced via
a demand function rather than entering directly in utility or through a shop-
ping time technology. Firms are monopolistically competitive and face a ﬁxed
3 Examples of this literature are Goodfriend and King (1997), and Chari, Kehoe, and Mc-
Grattan (1998).         
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schedule for changing prices. Speciﬁcally, one-quarter of the ﬁrms change their
price each period, and each ﬁrm can change its price only once a year. This type
of staggered time-dependent pricing behavior, referred to as a Taylor contract,
is a common methodology for introducing price stickiness into an otherwise
neoclassical model.
Consumers







where C = [
 1
0 c(i)(ε−1)/εdi]ε/(ε−1) is an index of consumption and n is the
fraction of time spent in employment.
Consumers also face the following intertemporal budget constraint:
PtCt + PtKt+1 ≤ Wtnt + [rt + (1 − δ)]PtKt + Divt,
where P = [
 1
0 p(i)1−εdi]1/(1−ε) is the price index associated with the aggrega-
tor C; W is the nominal wage rate; r is the rental rate on capital; δ is the rate
that capital depreciates; and Div are nominal dividend payments received from
ﬁrms.
The relevant ﬁrst-order conditions for the representative consumer’s prob-





(1/Ct) = βEt(1/Ct+1)[rt+1 + (1 − δ)]. (1b)
Equation (1a) equates the marginal disutility of work with the value of addi-
tional earnings. An increase in wages implies that individuals will work harder.
Equation (1b) describes the optimal savings behavior of individuals. If the re-
turn to saving (r) rises, then households will consume less today, saving more
and consuming more in the future.
The demand for money, which is just assumed rather than derived from
optimizing behavior, is given by
ln(Mt/Pt) = lnYt − ηRRt, (2)
where Y is the aggregator of goods produced in the economy and is the sum
of the consumption aggregator C and an analogous investment aggregator I.
The nominal interest rate is denoted R, and ηR is the interest semi-elasticity of
money demand. One could derive the money demand curve from a shopping
time technology without qualitatively affecting the results in the article.               
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Firms
There is a continuum of ﬁrms indexed by j that produce goods, y(j), using a
Cobb-Douglas technology that combines labor and capital according to
y(j) = atk(j)αn(j)1−α, (3)
where a is a technology shock that is the same for all ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm rents
capital and hires labor in economywide competitive factor markets. The cost-
minimizing demands for each factor are given by
ψtat(1 − α)[kt(j)/nt(j)]α = Wt/Pt (4a)
and
ψtatα[kt(j)/nt(j)]α−1 = rt, (4b)
where ψ is real marginal cost. The above conditions imply that capital-labor
ratios are equal across ﬁrms.
Although ﬁrms are competitors in factor markets, they have some monop-
oly power over their own product and face downward-sloping demand curves
of y(j) = (p(j)/P)−εY, where p(j) is the price that ﬁrm j charges for its product.
This demand curve results from individuals minimizing the cost of purchas-
ing the consumption index C and an analogous investment index. Firms are
allowed to adjust their price once every four periods and choose a price that
will maximize the expected value of the discounted stream of proﬁts over that







where real proﬁts at time t + h, φt+h(j), are given by [p∗
t (j)yt+h(j) −
ψt+hPt+hyt+h(j)]/Pt+h, and ∆t+h is an appropriate discount factor that is re-
lated to the way in which individuals value future as opposed to current
consumption.4













Furthermore, the symmetric nature of the economic environment implies that
all adjusting ﬁrms will choose the same price. One can see from equation (5)
that in a regime of zero inﬂation and constant marginal costs, ﬁrms would set
their relative price p∗(j)/P as a constant markup over marginal cost of
ε
ε−1.I n
general, a ﬁrm’s pricing decision depends on future marginal costs, the future
4 Speciﬁcally, the discount factor is the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption in period
t + h to the marginal utility of consumption in period t.         
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aggregate price level, future aggregate demand, and future discount rates. For
example, if a ﬁrm expects marginal costs to rise in the future, or if it expects
higher rates of inﬂation, it will choose a relatively higher current price for its
product.
The aggregate price level for the economy will depend on the prices the
various ﬁrms charge. Since all adjusting ﬁrms choose the same price, there will
be four different prices charged for the various individual goods. Each different
price is merely a function of when that price was last adjusted. The aggregate









Steady State and Calibration
An equilibrium in this economy is a vector of prices p∗
t−h, wages, rental rates,
and quantities that solves the ﬁrm’s maximization problem, the consumers’
optimization problem, and one in which the goods, capital, and labor markets
clear. Furthermore, the pricing decisions of ﬁrms must be consistent with the
aggregate pricing relationship (6) and with the behavior of the monetary au-
thority described in the next section. Although I will look at the economy’s
behavior when the Fed changes its policy rule, the above description of the
private sector will remain invariant across policy experiments.
The baseline steady state is solved for the following parameterization. La-
bor’s share, 1−α, is set at 2/3, ζ = 9/5,β = 0.984,ε = 10,δ = 0.025, ηR = 0,
and agents spend 20 percent of their time working. These parameter values
imply a steady-state ratio of I/Y of 18 percent, and a value of χ = 18.47. The
choice of ζ = 9/5 implies a labor supply elasticity of 1.25, which agrees with
recent work by Mulligan (1999). A value of ε = 10 implies a steady-state
markup of 11 percent, which is consistent with the empirical work in Basu and
Fernald (1997) and Basu and Kimball (1997). The interest sensitivity of money
demand is set at zero. The demand for money is generally acknowledged to
be fairly interest insensitive and zero is simply the extreme case. Since the
ensuing analysis concentrates on interest rate rules, the value of this parameter
is unimportant.
The economy is buffeted by a technology shock modeled as a random
walk and assumed to have a standard deviation of 1 percent. Thus, increases
in technology have a permanent effect on the economy. This speciﬁcation is
consistent with the assumptions of much of the empirical work in this area.
The Model under Constant Money Growth
In this section, I analyze the response of the model economy to a technol-
ogy shock under a constant money growth rule. As a preliminary matter, it is   
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worthwhile to recall how a standard real business cycle (RBC) model would
behave when subjected to such shocks. The behavior of real variables in the
baseline RBC model is closely mimicked in this model with a rule that keeps
the price markup and the inﬂation rate close to their steady-state values. The
behavior of the economy under such a rule is of independent interest as well,
because some recent work indicates that a constant markup would be a feature
of optimal monetary policy (e.g., King and Wolman [1999]).
The reason this policy produces a response in real variables very much
like that obtained in a model with ﬂexible prices can be seen by examining
equation (5). If prices were ﬂexible, then each ﬁrm would choose the same
price, and relative prices would equal unity. Real marginal cost would then be
 −1
  , which is exactly the steady-state value of marginal cost under staggered
price setting and zero inﬂation. If the steady-state inﬂation rate were zero, then
stabilizing real marginal cost at its steady-state value would imply that ﬁrms
would have no desire to deviate from steady-state behavior and would keep
their relative price constant at one. Thus, in an environment of zero average
inﬂation, stabilizing marginal cost or the markup leads to ﬁrm behavior that
replicates what ﬁrms would do in a world of ﬂexible prices. In short, when
inﬂation rates are close to zero, one can ﬁnd a policy that virtually replicates
the behavior found in a ﬂexible price model.
Figures 1a and 1b show the deviations of output, money stock, price level,
nominal interest rate, and inﬂation from their steady-state values in response
to a permanent increase in the level of technology under a rule that keeps
the markup approximately constant (it varies by less than 0.0002 percent from
its steady-state value of 0.11). Output initially jumps by 1.2 percent and then
gradually increases to its new steady-state value. The money supply grows
one-for-one with output, and given an income elasticity of one and an interest
elasticity of zero, its behavior is consistent with prices growing at their steady-
state rate of 2 percent. Consequently, inﬂation remains at its steady-state rate.
The slight uptick in the nominal interest rate is, therefore, entirely due to a
small increase in the real rate of interest.
In contrast, Figures 2a and 2b depict the behavior of the economy in
response to the same shock but with money supply growth kept at its steady-
state rate of 2 percent. From the money demand curve, equation (2), it is clear
that nominal income growth cannot deviate from steady state. If prices were
ﬂexible, they would fall by enough so that output would behave as shown
in Figure 1a. But, because 75 percent of the ﬁrms are unable to adjust their
prices, the price level declines by much less, and as a result the response of real
output is damped. As additional ﬁrms adjust their price over time, the price
level falls and output eventually reaches its new steady state. Falling prices
imply disinﬂation and a decline in the nominal interest rate. This behavior is
shown in Figure 2b.   
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Figure 1 Constant Markup and Technology Shock
By analyzing the various interest rate rules, it will become evident that
they differ in their ability to produce the type of output behavior associated
with ﬂexible prices. The above discussion should help in clarifying why that
is the case.    
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Figure 2 Constant Money Growth and Technology Shock
2. MONETARY POLICY
For studying the effects that the systematic part of monetary policy has on the
transmission of the various shocks to the economy, I shall be fundamentally         
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concerned with two basic types of policy rules. These rules employ an interest
rate instrument and fall into the category broadly labeled as Taylor (1993) type
rules. Both rules are backward-looking and allow the central bank to respond
to deviations of past inﬂation from its target and past output levels from the
steady-state level of output. However, one rule implies interest smoothing on
the part of the monetary authority. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst rule is given by
Rt = r + π∗ + 0.75(πt−1 − π∗) + 0.6(Yt−1 − Yt−1), (7)
where π∗ is the inﬂation target of 2 percent, and Y is the steady-state level
of output. Under this rule, the central bank responds only to readily avail-
able information when adjusting the nominal rate of interest. When inﬂation
is running above target or output is above trend, the central bank tightens
monetary policy by raising the nominal interest rate. This type of rule restores
the inﬂation rate to 2 percent after the shock’s effects dissipate. The rule differs
from the original one proposed by Taylor in that it includes a response to last
quarter’s lagged inﬂation rather than current yearly inﬂation, and the coefﬁ-
cient on inﬂation is somewhat smaller than that initially speciﬁed by Taylor
(1993). This speciﬁcation is adopted for two reasons. First, as emphasized by
McCallum (1997), the elements of a feedback rule should involve only variables
that are readily observable. Although contemporaneous output and inﬂation are
observed in the stylistic setting of the model, in practice these variables may
be observed only with a lag.5 Second, the rule speciﬁed in (7) is explosive for
the parameters chosen by Taylor. In the above lagged speciﬁcation, explosive
behavior results if the monetary authority responds too aggressively to both
inﬂation and output.6
The second rule is similar to the ﬁrst but adds a degree of interest rate
smoothing. The actual interest rate can be thought of as a weighted average of
some target that depends on the state of the economy and last period’s nominal
interest rate. The greater the weight on the nominal interest rate, the more
concerned the monetary authority is for smoothing the interest rate. This rule
is given by7
Rt = r + π∗ + 0.75Rt−1 + 0.75(πt−1 − π∗) + 0.15(Yt−1 − Yt−1). (8)
5 In actuality the Fed does not observe potential or steady-state output either. It must respond
to estimates.
6 If the interest rate rule was speciﬁed in terms of the deviation of a four-quarter average of
inﬂation from target, then a coefﬁcient on inﬂation’s deviation from target of 1.5 and a coefﬁcient
on output’s deviation from a potential of 0.5 would produce well-behaved economic responses to
shocks. For a detailed discussion of issues regarding determinacy and instability, see Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) and Christiano and Gust (1999).
7 I initially tried to use the same coefﬁcient on output as in the ﬁrst rule, but the behavior
of the economy was erratic. Scaling down the coefﬁcient on lagged real activity produced more
reasonable behavior.   
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Contrary to many theoretical and empirical studies, the model experiments
I run in the ensuing section take a far-from-typical perspective concerning the
effects of monetary policy than is usually taken in theoretical and empirical
studies. Standard investigations attempt to determine how the economy re-
acts to policy shocks represented as unexpected disturbances to either money
growth rates or the interest rate set by the Fed. While those analyses tackle
an interesting problem, only recently have economists begun to analyze the
economic effects of the systematic component of policy. By concentrating on
the sensitivity of the economy’s responses to various shocks under different
policies, the article has a different emphasis from much of the recent work
on systematic policy. The analysis is, therefore, similar in emphasis to recent
papers by McCallum (1999) and Christiano and Gust (1999).
3. A COMPARISON OF THE POLICY RULES
This section analyzes the way the model economy reacts to a technology shock
under the two different interest rate rules. These responses are depicted in
Figures 3 and 4, where as before all changes represent deviations from steady-
state values. Figures 3a and 3b and Figures 4a and 4b refer to rules 1 and 2,
respectively. The differences across the policy rules are striking, especially
when one also considers the behavior depicted in Figures 1 and 2. Although
output increases on impact under each rule, the magnitude of the increase varies
greatly across policy regimes, ranging from less than 0.4 percent for a money
growth rule to approximately 2.5 percent under the Taylor rule that uses interest
rate smoothing. The impulse response for output under the Taylor rule that does
not employ interest rate smoothing is closest to the response shown in Figures
1 and 2 for a standard RBC model.
The nominal behavior of the economy is also very different under the var-
ious rules. Under the ﬁrst rule the price level barely moves on impact but then
falls as the effect of the technology shock works its way through the economy.
This behavior is in sharp contrast to that associated with the constant money
growth rule in which the price level declines on impact. It is, therefore, not
staggered price setting that is responsible for the initial stickiness of the price
level but the speciﬁcation of the interest rate rule. Because the nominal interest
rate responds only to lagged variables, it doesn’t react initially. Consequently,
all the money demanded at the initial interest rate is supplied, and there is no
need for price adjustment to equilibrate the money market. With output slightly
below its new steady-state value, the nominal interest begins to decline, and it
continues to decline in response to falling prices. It is important to emphasize
that the decline in the interest rate does not represent an easing of policy but
rather an endogenous response to an economic shock. That is, the central bank
is not attempting to independently stimulate the economy.   
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Figure 3 Taylor Rule and Technology Shock
Under the second rule the economy booms. Output rises by an extraor-
dinary 2.5 percent, and with it is an accompanying increase in marginal cost
as ﬁrms must bid up the wage to induce additional labor supply. The increase
in marginal cost implies that adjusting ﬁrms will raise their prices. In contrast   
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Figure 4 Smooth Taylor Rule and Technology Shock
to the previous example, the economy experiences inﬂation in response to the
increase in technology. Because prices will be rising over time, the current
period is a relatively good time to consume, and output demand is high as
well. The increase in inﬂation as well as the increase in output above its new   
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steady-state level causes the central bank to raise interest rates. As in the pre-
vious case, the subsequent rise in the interest rate should not be interpreted as
an attempt to shock an overheated economy but simply as the central bank’s
usual response to strong economic growth. The endogenous rise in the interest
rates, as we shall see in the next section, is responsible for the dramatic fall
in economic activity. The initial overshooting is subsequently corrected, and
output then gradually approaches its new steady-state level. It is important to
note that under the two rules the marked difference in the impulse response
functions is not due to the somewhat smaller coefﬁcient on lagged output in
the second rule. If that coefﬁcient were increased to 0.6, then the response of
the economy would be similar but the volatility, or saw-toothed behavior, of
the variables would be more pronounced.
The difference in the functions is due to the interest rate smoothing present
in the second policy rule. Under the ﬁrst policy rule, any increase in inﬂation
is aggressively reacted to because the monetary authority does not have to
take into account the past level of the interest rate. Knowing the relatively
aggressive nature of policy, individuals and ﬁrms expect less inﬂation, creating
less pressure to raise prices. The subsequent downward path of prices makes
postponing purchases optimal. As a result, there is less demand pressure in
response to the shock. Output does not rise to its new steady-state level on im-
pact, and there is no upward pressure on marginal cost. Under the second policy
rule, the monetary authority will be less aggressive, so prices are expected to
rise. Such expectations spur consumers to purchase goods today, resulting in
relatively strong aggregate demand. The economy booms and the combined
effect of expected inﬂation and upward pressure on marginal cost causes ﬁrms
to raise prices.
There are a number of points to take away from the analysis presented in
this section. First and foremost is that the systematic component of monetary
policy is key in determining the economy’s reaction to shocks. For example,
with no interest rate smoothing, inﬂation and prices are negatively correlated
with output, while they are positively correlated when the monetary authority
smooths the interest rate. As a consequence of sticky prices, both positive
and negative correlations between real and nominal variables are possible. The
type of correlation observed may be entirely due to the systematic behavior of
monetary policy and have nothing to do with the structure of the economy.
4. A FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF TAYLOR RULES
In this section I illustrate the sensitivity of the model economy’s responses
under the two policy rules to a transitory tightening of monetary policy as
reﬂected in a 100 basis point increase in the nominal interest rate. As with the
case of the technology shock, the responses are very different. These responses   
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are displayed in Figures 5 and 6, with 5a and 5b depicting the response under
the ﬁrst rule and 6a and 6b reﬂecting behavior under the second rule.
Under rule 1 output actually rises on impact, while under the interest rate
smoothing rule output falls. This difference in behavior occurs because the un-
expected rise in the nominal rate under the ﬁrst rule will accommodate modest
inﬂation. As long as inﬂation doesn’t accelerate—behavior the rule is designed
to prevent—the nominal rate will gradually return to steady state, and there
will be upward movement in prices as well as strong economic growth. The
economy only suffers a mild recession four quarters into the future.
The presence of interest rate smoothing in this case means that any upward
movement in real economic activity or inﬂation will drive the interest rate even
higher. Rather than acting as an anchor as in the previous section, the interest
smoothing term implies a much more aggressive response to nominal growth.
Because today’s interest rate is high, all things being equal, the next period’s
interest rate will be high as well. Individuals and ﬁrms understand the nature
of the rule, and, therefore, an increase in nominal activity is inconsistent with
interest rate behavior under this rule. Output, prices, and inﬂation decline im-
mediately in response to the rise in the nominal interest rate. It is noteworthy
that the nominal interest is more volatile under the policy rule that reﬂects a
concern for interest rate smoothing.
Thus, if the Fed were to signiﬁcantly and periodically alter its reaction
to the past behavior of interest rates, policy would appear to operate with
variable impact effects and variable lagged effects. It would do so not because
the changes in the policy rule are reﬂected in small quantitative differences in
the economy’s response to policy shocks but because these changes in policy
may actually lead to an economy that qualitatively responds in a different way
altogether.
Admittedly, the behavioral changes analyzed may be severe and the model
economy may not reﬂect important elements of actual behavior, but the exper-
iments in this and the preceding section send a strong message that the form
of the policy rule is far from innocuous.
5. CONCLUSION
The basic conclusion of this article is that money matters. More to the point,
monetary policy matters, and speciﬁcally the systematic part of monetary policy
matters. While most studies have devoted a great deal of effort to understanding
and quantifying the economic effects of monetary policy shocks, my results
indicate that it may be equally if not more important to determine the appro-
priate design of a policy rule. From my own perspective, which is inﬂuenced
by numerous (or perhaps endless) policy debates, what is typically discussed
is not what monetary disturbance should impact the economy but what response   
56 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 5 Taylor Rule and Policy Shock
should policy have to the economy. Signiﬁcant tightenings of policy are gener-
ally not an attempt to shock the economy but the Fed’s realization that inﬂation
and expected inﬂation have risen and that tightening is appropriate. The de-
gree of the response may, and probably does, vary in different periods. And it   
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Figure 6 Smooth Taylor Rule and Policy Shock
may be inappropriate to model these changes as shocks to an unvarying rule.
As I have shown, the sign of correlations among economic variables can differ
across rules. That type of behavior would not be captured by appending a shock
to a given policy rule. The message from the above exercises is that it may be    
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more appropriate to model the coefﬁcients in the response function as random,
rather than attaching some randomness to an invariant rule.
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